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Abstract 
Experimentation is traditionally considered a privileged means of confirmation. 
However, how experiments are a better confirmatory source than other strategies is 
unclear, and recent discussions have identified experiments with various modeling 
strategies on the one hand, and with ‘natural’ experiments on the other hand. We 
argue that experiments aiming to test theories are best understood as controlled 
investigations of specimens. ‘Control’ involves repeated, fine-grained causal 
manipulation of focal properties. This capacity generates rich knowledge of the object 
investigated. ‘Specimenhood’ involves possessing relevant properties given the 
investigative target and the hypothesis in question. Specimens are thus representative 
members of a class of systems, to which a hypothesis refers. It is in virtue of both 
control and specimenhood that experiments provide powerful confirmatory evidence. 
This explains the distinctive power of experiments: although modellers exert 
extensive control, they do not exert this control over specimens; although natural 
experiments utilize specimens, control is diminished.  
1. Introduction  
Traditionally, experiments are a privileged method of bringing the empirical and 
theoretical into contact. In particular, experiments are taken as an especially powerful way of 
confirming theoretical hypotheses. When experimentation is infeasible—in cosmology, 
geology, much of evolutionary biology and other areas—this is seen as a barrier to progress, 
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because it hinders confirmation. There is a large literature on confirmation, but surprisingly 
little of it deals with experimentation per se2. Further, several recent authors, noting 
similarities between experiments and other forms of confirmation – observations of natural 
phenomena (so-called ‘natural experiments’) and theoretical modeling (especially computer 
simulation) – contest the distinctive character of experiments, blurring the lines between 
experimentation, observation and modeling. Thus, a discussion of the role of experiments in 
confirmation is apropos.  
We argue that the traditional view is right: experiments are a privileged means of 
confirmation; attempts to collapse experiments and other epistemic methods fail. We do so by 
presenting an account of experimentation and by diffusing competing arguments. On our view, 
experiments are: (1) controlled manipulations; that (2) pertain to typical instances of natural 
phenomena – or, as we designate them, specimens. Performing controlled manipulations 
generates fine-grained, discriminating information. Examining specimens underwrites moving 
from such information to more general conclusions. It is the combination of these two features 
which uniquely endows experiments with distinctive confirmatory power. These general 
contours should not be surprising: our view is a natural way of understanding traditional takes 
on experimentation. However, the details matter. Among other things, these details show why 
recent attempts to identify experiments with modeling and with ‘natural’ experiments fail. This, 
in turn, sheds further light on the place of experimentation in science. 
After presenting an illustrative case, section 2 expands on ‘control’ and ‘specimenhood’. 
We then utilize this account in criticizing arguments for identifying experimentation with 
modeling, (section 3), and then with natural observations (section 4). This critical discussion 
is not merely negative in character; it grounds our claim about the superiority of experiment as 
a means of confirmation. Our criticisms will illuminate just what is so important about the 
combination of control and specimenhood for confirmation. 
Our discussion focuses on hypothesis-driven experiments and their role in confirmation: 
studies aiming to test theoretical hypotheses against the world. Many empirical 
investigations, including experiments, have other structures and aims. Some are 
‘exploratory’, seeking new phenomena, (Franklin, 2005). Others act as ‘possibility proofs’ 
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(Wimsatt, 2015), or provide novel results which drive further research (Morgan, 2005; Parke 
2014; Currie 2017a). Still others verify the proper functioning of complex instruments 
(Galison, 1987). These types of experiments are important and interesting, but we won’t 
discuss them here and remain neutral about whether our claims extend to them.  
Furthermore, we are concerned with a certain aspect of confirmation. Issues surrounding 
confirmation can be divided into (at least) two types. The first concerns evidential sources: 
where and how evidence is generated, the relative significance of various sources, the relation 
between evidence-based and other forms of knowledge, and so on. The second type concerns 
the structure of evidential relations: are they probabilistic or logical? Discrete or graded? etc. 
These are connected, but can often be analyzed separately. We tackle the former issue: the 
significance of experiments relative to other means of obtaining evidence. We do not 
presuppose a specific view on the latter, structural issue. So far as we can see, our claims do 
not depend on answering such questions. 
Finally, our discussion is normative, in the sense that we describe the evidential status of 
successful experiments. It is possible that many experiments fall short of the standards 
embodied in our account. We think real-life successes are not uncommon, but we shall not 
assess this matter explicitly. We outline an ideal: how experiments, when done right (and 
when luck agrees) provide particularly powerful confirmatory oomph. As an ideal, our 
account is fruitfully considered as a set of dimensions along which various investigations 
might fall. Those which approach the ideal—‘bone-fide’ experiments—have impressive 
confirmatory powers, while those departing from it are diminished in this regard. Crucially, 
this does not conflict with modeling or more passive observation figuring importantly in 
experimentation or confirmation. Indeed we accept, as explained below, that generating 
experimental data often requires the use of models. But we deny that models or natural 
experiments should be identified with experiments, or that they are epistemically similar. 
2. Experiment as controlled investigation of specimens 
Our account involves two central concepts - control and specimen – and highlights the 
importance of their combination. In this section we articulate these notions, providing a first 
pass analysis of experimentation. Subsequent sections further elaborate the concepts and 
clarify the importance of combining them, via comparisons between experimentation and 
other investigative methods. 
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To fix ideas, we begin with a simple, yet historically important, example: Isaac Newton’s 
experimentum crucis (Walsh, 2012, 2017). Newton carried out the experiment sometime 
between 1665-1667 at his home in Woolsthorpe. Initially presented to the royal society in 
1672, it was foundational for his Opticks, in 1704. The experiment dealt with the composition 
of white light (or at least sunlight). On the prevailing view of the time, such light is 
homogenous, i.e. composed of rays with identical properties. Different colours come about 
via modifications of white light. A potential competing hypothesis held that white light is 
heterogeneous, composed of rays of different colours.  
Newton used an aperture in a window-shutter to isolate a beam of sunlight, transmitted 
through a prism. The prism projected the beam onto a screen, producing a full colour 
spectrum. A further aperture in this screen isolated a small part of the spectrum (another 
beam), transmitted through to a second prism.  The second prism projected the light onto 
another screen. Shifting the angle of the first prism, and noticing the position of the light on 
the final screen, made it possible to record the light’s ‘refrangibility’—its disposition to 
refract. 
Newton reasoned that if sunlight is homogenous, then isolating different parts of the 
spectrum will not change the position of the light projected onto the far screen: the prism’s 
angle will not make a difference. Alternatively, if light is heterogeneous, then the position of 
the light will change, depending on which part of the spectrum is isolated (this is on the 
assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between refrangibility and spectral colour). He 
performed the experiment to find the latter option holds: varying the angle of the first prism 
varied the position of the light on the final screen. Newton concluded that light was 
heterogeneous: 
And so the true cause of the length of that Image was detected to be no other, then that 
Light consists of Rays differently refrangible, which, without any respect to a 
difference in their incidence, were, according to their degrees of refrangibility, 
transmitted towards divers parts of the wall. (Newton 1672, 3086) 
The Experimentum crucis is a paradigmatic experiment, and illustrates our view. To 
begin, let us distinguish the object of an experiment and its target (Winsberg, 2009; Parke, 
2014). The object is the concrete system which is manipulated; the immediate source of 
experimental data. Newton examined isolated beams of light, coming through his chamber 
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window, under contrived conditions. That was his object. Targets of investigation, in 
contrast, are the phenomena which we ultimately seek to understand. Newton was interested 
in the properties of sunlight in general. That was his target. The two aspects of experiment 
which we identify track, first, our epistemic access to the object; and second, our capacity to 
extrapolate from object to target. These are discussed in turn.  
2.1 Control 
Like other paradigm experiments, Newton’s study was controlled and this allowed him to 
draw rich, stable information about his object of study. Specifically, it involved three key 
features: 
First, the experiment isolated an object of study, namely a ray of “fully coloured” white 
light. Light is abundant. It interacts with a wide variety of objects and forces under a wide 
variety of conditions. Newton’s experiment depended on isolating rays of sunlight via the 
aperture: he was able to separate some rays of light from their regular environment and 
restrict their interactions to those relevant to his hypothesis. More generally, isolation 
concerns the ability to examine a system separately from the “raw” empirical world. Isolating 
an object entails severing, as far as possible, its causal connections to its environment, 
leaving the object’s focal properties (those central to the experiment’s aim) undisturbed.  
Second, Newton manipulated his object of study by passing rays of light through a pair of 
prisms at varying angles. This altered the light’s behaviour in subtle ways, allowing him to 
observe a telling effect: the change in the light’s position on the screen, indicative of its 
‘refrangability’. Manipulation involves causally interacting with the relevant properties of the 
object, while holding other factors fixed. Thus, while isolation involves severing ties to the 
environment, manipulation consists in making changes to specified properties of the object, 
and only to those properties. With isolation, manipulation allows the generation of effects 
which tell for or against the hypothesis under consideration3. 
Third, Newton’s experiment was repeatable. It could be carried out over and over again, 
allowing multiple data to be obtained. Moreover, the experimental procedure could be 
mimicked by anyone with the required equipment and knowhow. It did not depend on 
transient features nor on knowledge that could not, in principle, be passed along. When the 
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potential to be replicated is realized, experiments have strong confirmatory powers. A well-
isolated, controlled but unrepeated experiment is less powerful than one which has been 
repeated. Confirmation requires bodies of data, and experimental validation (which we 
discuss below in light of specimens) demands that experimental results not be fluky.4  
Further, combined with isolation and manipulation, repeatability allows an experimenter 
to conduct rich explorations of her object by finely varying the experimental circumstances 
while generating many significant data. This provides thorough information about the object. 
Thus, an object is subjected to control when isolated from its natural environment and 
intervened upon in a replicable way. However, the power of experimentation does not rely on 
control alone.  It also depends on the kind of objects over which control is exerted, namely 
specimens.  
2.2 Specimens 
Control concerns the interaction between an experimenter and her object. The object’s 
being a specimen underwrites the move from knowledge about the object to conclusions 
about the investigation’s target. 
Hypothesis-driven experiments aim to ascertain empirical facts pertinent to the 
confirmation of a specified hypothesis, a hypothesis about some portion of the natural world. 
Paradigm experiments, like Newton’s, can confirm (or disconfirm) hypotheses because their 
object of study is, in some sense, informative about the target of investigation. What must the 
object be like for this to be the case? We propose that the object should be a specimen, i.e. a 
typical instance of the target. By working with a specimen an investigator brings part of the 
world into the lab, so to speak. Roughly, we hold that typicality and the potential for 
confirmation are positively linked: all else equal, the more typical a specimen, the greater its 
confirmatory potential.  
Being a specimen, then, depends on an object’s being ‘typical’. But what is typicality?  In 
Newton’s case, the answer is fairly straightforward: he was interested in the composition of 
sunlight. To this end, he examined instances of sunlight. These instances were typical 
                                                             
4 In some experimental contexts a single “result” is suitable; we have in mind successful 
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a series of (repeated) experiments.  
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inasmuch as they shared the composition of sunlight in general. Here, composition was a 
focal property: a property of the target which the hypothesis directly concerns came under 
experimental test. Sharing of focal properties is what made Newton’s experimental object – 
sunlight from his window – informative about his target – sunlight in general. 
This can be generalized: experimental objects inform us about targets insofar as the 
former are typical instances of the latter. Typicality can be understood in terms of similarity – 
in the limit, sameness – of focal properties. A specimen, we suggest, is typical inasmuch as it 
shares focal properties with the target. Can this notion be further specified? Some 
philosophers restrict attention to material similarity between objects and targets. In this view, 
what makes something an experimentally relevant object (a specimen, in our terms) is its 
being made of the ‘same stuff’ as the target. This has been cashed out by contrasting ‘deep’, 
material continuity, with mere formal or organizational continuity (Guala 2002), and by an 
experiment materially ‘replicating’ a part of the world (Morgan 2005). We grant that material 
similarity matters in some contexts, but we doubt this line of thought’s generality. For one 
thing, it is often not obvious what counts as similar material composition (Parke, 2014). For 
another, material continuity (however understood) is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
capturing experimentation’s power.  Consider properties like being a parasite, a predator, or a 
voltaic cell; or think of the Stroop effect, Compton scattering, or the founder effect. The 
definitive features of these phenomena are not material composition, and experimental 
investigation relevant to them needn’t be performed on materially similar objects (Parker 
2009).  
There are diverse kinds of object-target similarities that may undergird experimental 
relevance. And there do not seem to be in-principle limits on which kinds of properties good 
experimental objects share with their targets. Material composition can be central. But 
sometimes structural, dynamical and/or dispositional features are key. For this reason, we do 
not think it possible to specify, in general terms, the properties that an experimental object 
must share with its target. An object’s being a specimen depends on its sharing focal 
properties with the target. But what these relevant focal properties are depends on the 
experimental context and the hypothesis under consideration.  
If material composition cannot constrain specimenhood, what does? On our view 
constraint comes from the procedures underwriting how specimen are obtained. This is 
critical from an epistemic standpoint, since the epistemic value of a specimen depends on not 
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its merely being a specimen, but on its specimenhood being known (or justifiably held). The 
key, we suggest, is the employment of an unbiased drawing procedure – i.e. a procedure for 
selecting an object, ‘collecting it from the world’, that preserves typicality. The underlying 
intuition is that in making an unbiased drawing we are “bringing the world into the lab” 
without introducing interference and distortion, preserving those aspects of the world that we 
are interested in understanding.  
“Clean” unbiased drawing involves statistical sampling. A subset is selected from a large 
population in order to estimate some property. Statistics provides methods for making such 
selections, enhancing the sample’s representativeness, i.e. ensuring that the distribution of 
values of the relevant feature in the sample resembles the distribution in the general 
population. In the simplest cases, random selection suffices. Randomness is important 
because it reduces (in the limit, eliminates) bias: each member of the population is as likely 
as any other to be sampled. Therefore, irrelevant factors are unlikely (in the limit, guaranteed 
not) to affect the estimate.  
In some cases, an experimental object can be the product of this kind of random 
sampling, and its typicality is thereby assured. But we can extend the notion of unbiased 
selection and understand an unbiased selection process as one that reduces the risk of 
selecting an unusual object, and which preserves typicality by avoiding problematic 
alterations of the object. All this is, of course, relative to the aims of the experiment. 
Newton’s experiment probed ordinary light. He obtained his experimental object by letting 
light through his window, presuming there was nothing special about the sunlight hitting his 
windowpane, in terms of its color composition. Furthermore, he presumed that the passage of 
the light through the window did not alter it. These assumptions constitute grounds for taking 
his object of study as a specimen, a typical instance of white light. These kinds of procedures 
allow us to ensure our objects of study are specimens – by proper statistical sampling when 
possible or by unbiased collection, given the experiment’s aims. Of course, the exact nature 
of the collection process will depend on the subject matter and the object sought. But the 
general idea is to bring a part of the world, “as is”, into the lab.5 
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Below, in sections 3 and 4, we argue that it is the combination of control and 
specimenhood which underwrite experimentation’s privileged status vis-à-vis confirmation. 
But first, we should discuss the possibility of tension between these two attributes. 
2.3 Do control and specimenhood conflict? 
Objects and targets differ, sometimes dramatically. Objects must be procured—they must 
be drawn from the world and isolated in an experimental setting, and they must be 
prepared— made amenable to control. Procurement and preparation potentially involve 
departures from typicality, when they “tamper” with focal properties. This situation underlies 
some skeptical stances towards experimentation (e.g. Cartwright 1999). Briefly put, the 
worry is that the data we generate in our experiment is an artifact of the prepared nature of 
our object— or at any rate, that data pertains to the procured and prepared object, but not 
necessarily to the natural system of interest.  
This is an important issue; but it does not present insurmountable scientific challenges, nor 
does it generate special worries for our account. Typicality, as we have delineated it, holds 
relative to the features specified by the hypothesis under consideration, and to the drawing 
procedures involve in obtainment. And so, only processes of procurement and preparation 
which affect focal properties and biased drawing procedures are potentially problematic. 
Newton’s light was in an unusual circumstance: light beams do not often spend time 
squeezing through apertures, bending in prisms, then bouncing off walls. However, vis-à-vis 
his hypotheses, these departures from the usual are not departures from typicality, as they do 
not affect the composition of white light—the focal property in question.  
However, many experimental systems depend on more extreme procurement and preparation. 
Model organisms, extensively used in biology, are cases in point: they are raised for 
generations under artificial conditions and bred to have unusual characteristics like genetic 
homogeneity, making them more suitable for lab-based study (Levy & Currie, 2015). Surely 
                                                             
However, there are important differences. First, in contrast to Elgin, we place weight on how a 
specimen was obtained. We think this matters for the specimen’s epistemic role: a specimen is an 
object drawn (in an unbiased way) from the world. Assumptions about how it was obtained, i.e. 
whether the drawing was indeed unbiased and why, matter for justifying conclusions drawn from the 
specimen regarding the object of study. A further difference, perhaps pursuant to this one, is that 
Elgin employs the notion of exemplification to account for how models relate to the world (2010). We 
argue against such an application of specimenhood. 
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under such circumstances the needs of control clash with specimen procurement? Not 
necessarily. 
The relationship between object and target—in particular the object’s typicality—is an 
empirically tractable matter. As mentioned in §2.2, there are better and worse ways of 
procuring and preparing depending on context, and scientists often have highly developed 
and sophisticated methods for doing so. For instance, biologists working on model organisms 
standardly compare their results against ‘wild-types’. Wild-type organisms are lab-reared, but 
retain some similarities with specimens prior to experimental trials. They thus provide a 
baseline from which mutants diverge. Wild-type organisms, among other things, provide a 
kind of middle ground between truly wild specimens and highly prepared organisms, thus 
bridging the divide between lab and world. So, scientists can experimentally probe the 
distance between their objects and targets. If there are departures from typicality, such studies 
can clarify these. Consequences, regarding how informative the object is vis-à-vis the target, 
can then be assessed. Control in fact aids us in solving such “external validity” issues. 
Furthermore, cases where control and specimenhood do conflict are not paradigm 
experiments, and just in the way predicted by our account. If, in order to conduct a controlled 
investigation, I must change my object such that it is not (or is less) relevantly representative 
of my target, then my capacity to confirm hypotheses is diminished. Vice-versa, when control 
is sacrificed for specimenhood, the confirmatory significance of the results is similarly 
weakened. It is the combination of specimenhood and control that marks off experiments: 
where they conflict, the investigation at hand diverges from the experimental. How these two 
properties underwrite the confirmatory power of experiment is the subject of the next two 
sections, in which we compare experiments to other epistemic practices. 
3. Experimentation versus modeling  
The distinction between modeling and experimentation is a special case of the broader 
distinction between theoretical and empirical. Models, and theoretical devices more 
generally, are representations of the world – attempts to say something about some range of 
phenomena. In representing some natural system, a theory or model tells us to expect, or to 
entertain the possibility, that the system is a certain way. In contrast, empirical work, like 
experiment and observation, is a means of making causal contact with the world. We will not 
offer an account of representation (or of causal contact, for that matter). But we do assume 
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that theories and models carry content in an intentional sense – they are about something, 
typically something in the actual empirical world. And what they say about the world may be 
correct or incorrect, accurate or inaccurate. 
Models are a kind of theoretical device, typically geared towards a relatively specific 
target system and usually containing deliberate deviations from accuracy and completeness 
such as idealizations, abstractions, and approximations. Views differ as to how, exactly, 
models represent the world. We remain ecumenical, relying on no particular account. We 
only suppose, first, that models are theoretical representations, in the minimal sense discussed 
above. And, second, the widely shared idea that models can be, and often are, studied 
independently of the world, as self-contained simplifications of a complex reality. This is 
often expressed by stating that models have “autonomy” (Morgan and Morrison, 1999) or 
that models serve as surrogates for complex systems in the world.6  
Modeling and experimentation have similarities. Models are often constructed on the 
basis of broader theoretical assumptions, before being subjected to analysis, which often 
involves tweaking various variables and ascertaining the consequences. Nowadays this often 
involves computer simulation, a form of numerical analysis, wherein the model is 
implemented via computer software, values are assigned to variables, parameters, and (when 
needed) initial conditions, and the software is run, often repeatedly. One then (usually) takes 
the results and forms a claim about the target. Thus in both modeling and experimentation 
there is a setup phase – of the experimental apparatus or the model – that may be grounded in 
background theory. This is followed by an investigation of the model/object – a run of the 
experiment or of the simulation – in its own terms, i.e. in the lab or on the computer. And 
finally, a move is made from the result-in-the-object to the target-in-the-world. 
However, these rough similarities do not undermine, and should not obscure, the key 
difference we identified above: Models are representations; they are about the world, while 
experiments are not. Modeling results can be correct or incorrect, or more or less accurate, 
depending on the soundness of assumptions and the adequacy of analysis. Experiment, by 
contrast, are causal interactions with instances of targets. The experimental object is drawn 
from the world, and if the drawing is done appropriately, preserving typicality, then one can 
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a stand, here at any rate, as to whether modelling involves indirect representation (Godfrey-Smith, 
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infer from the experimental results to conclusions about the target. That is to say: 
experiments are not representations and do not carry semantic content. They are not the sort 
of thing that can be right or wrong, accurate or inaccurate. Instead, they are concrete physical 
setups which allow scientists to engage a specimen of their target. The light shining through 
Newton’s window, refracting through prisms as it did, was not a representation of the 
phenomenon of white light. It was an instance of an actual ray of light.   
Crucially, this is reflected in the manner in which one justifies object-to-target inferences 
in modeling on the one hand, and experimentation on the other.7 When inferring from the 
results of a simulation to a claim about the world, an investigator must have confidence in 
what her model says about the world. She must be sure of her background theory, and the 
assumptions and techniques used to construct the model, program the simulation and so on.  
She must know, in other words, that she has adequately represented the world in her model 
and in the way she has implemented and analyzed it. The grounds underlying an inference 
from experimental objects to their targets are different. While both must worry about external 
validity, the modeller is concerned with the adequacy of her representation, the 
experimentalist is concerned with the typicality of her specimen. As we’ve seen, this consists 
in an experimenter’s confidence that her object was appropriately drawn from the world, and 
that experimental manipulation—preparation and the exertion of control—has not 
undermined the object’s typicality. What is required isn’t, primarily, sound theoretical 
knowledge (at least, not knowledge of the target), but confidence that one is experimenting 
on the relevant object, that one’s object is a specimen, taken “as is” from the world. Put 
differently: whereas a successful experiment confronts theory with the world, a model fleshes 
out existing theoretical knowledge and/or assumptions. To be sure, modeling may show us 
that a certain hypothesis is impossible or unlikely, and thus provide new information about 
the world. But this differs from confirmation, in the sense of a direct “meeting” between 
theory and reality. A model may inform us about the world, but when it does, it is not by 
testing a theoretical hypothesis against the world. 
Having outlined the distinction between modeling and experimentation in positive terms, 
we now discuss – and reject – recent arguments that seek to identify the two.8  
                                                             
7 For a related view, focusing on simulation, see Winsberg (2009). 
8 These discussions tend to ask whether models and experiments are on epistemic par, simpliciter. 
We, however, restrict our claims to confirmation. 
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3.1 Experiments as representations?  
Uskali Mäki (2005) explicitly identifies models with experiments. One of his arguments 
concerns control: he argues that both models and experiments are means of isolating a system 
for the purpose of studying a specific feature or process. One may question whether the 
interaction between modeller and model (or simulation) is causal and therefore whether a 
model is genuinely subject to control. But we will not pursue this. We accept that something 
akin to control occurs in modeling: A model represents a given system or phenomenon, often 
ignoring other systems entirely (i.e. isolation) and making idealized and approximate 
simplifying assumptions (i.e. manipulation). Runs of a simulation can and usually are 
repeated, often many times (i.e. repetition). Indeed, in exerting control, modellers, like 
experimenters, produce rich information about their objects. But Mäki also claims that 
experiments involve representation, and here we disagree.   
 Mäki holds that an object represents if, first, it is used by an agent as a stand-in, i.e. as an 
object that substitutes for something in the world; second, the object resembles the target, in 
respects relevant for the task at hand. Given this definition, he says, it follows that 
experiments are models: “[E]xperimental systems are representatives of some real non-
experimental systems: they are material models of aspects of the rest of the world.” (2005, 
306). We believe this argument equivocates: it conflates something’s being an intentional, 
semantic representation, in the sense discussed above, with the rather different notion of 
representativeness.  
Recall that specimens are typical members of the kind under investigation, obtained by 
drawing from the world. We could say: a specimen is a representative instance of the target. 
But this sense of ‘representation’ is critically different from that applicable to models. 
Experimental systems, when suitably chosen, represent similarly to how statistical samples 
do – by being not-unusual subsets of the larger class, members of the kind in question. This is 
not representation in an intentional sense, and the difference is reflected in the epistemology: 
in a successful experiment the object is a specimen, and confirmation is possible because it 
has been procured via an unbiased procedure (or the bias is known and accounted for). To be 
sure, experimental specimens have been brought into the lab and manipulated. But as argued 
above, if properly chosen and handled, typicality often survives nonetheless. In contrast, a 
model represents the world by being about it. Often models are sets of equations or computer 
simulations: not in any relevant sense drawn from the world, and thus a “sampling”-like 
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justification for being representative is irrelevant. Instead, what justifies thinking that the 
model represents is the theoretical considerations that led to the model's construction and the 
reasons for thinking that this way of representing the world is appropriate and accurate for the 
purpose at hand. Modellers examine their objects in great detail to ensure that they capture 
the intended dynamics.  
This difference is sufficiently dramatic that regarding models as experimental objects is 
misleading, at best. Moreover, it illustrates our point that mere control is insufficient for 
experimental confirmatory power: because modellers do not exert control over specimens, 
they lack something distinctive of experimenters.  
Let’s address a potential worry: if structural properties are amongst those that can be 
shared across specimens and targets, would that not open the door for models to count as 
specimens? After all, models often instantiate structures that are present in the target, or at 
least structures that resemble those of the target. The worry stems from a correct observation: 
specimens can share structural properties with targets and in this sense models do exhibit 
some of the features of specimens. But merely sharing properties with the target is not 
sufficient for specimens to play the epistemic roles they do; it matters how this fact is 
ascertained (§2.2). Specimens are drawn from nature, in the sense explained above. Models 
are not. To know that a model shares structural (or other) properties with a target we need 
confidence in our modeling assumptions and techniques, as just outlined—and these do not 
concern preserving typicality through procurement and preparation. Thus, while a model may 
share structural properties (as well as other properties) with a target and in that respect fulfil 
some of the conditions for specimenhood, it falls short of specimenhood insofar as our 
justification for believing property sharing holds is significantly different in character.  
3.2 The model-ladeness of experiments  
We now turn to a different attempt to blur the line between models and experiments, 
presented by Margaret Morrison (2009). Morrison examines the role played by models in 
ascertaining unknown physical quantities. She argues that modeling can function much like 
measurement, a type of experimentation.   
Morrison highlights circumstances where simple measurement is infeasible unless 
scaffolded with models, suggesting therefore that measurement inherently involves modeling 
and simulation. We consider this an argument from the model-ladeness of measurement. She 
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examines measuring the gravitational acceleration of the earth by using a simple plane 
pendulum. This involves a Newtonian equation that relates three variables: the pendulum’s 
length l, the period of oscillation T and the acceleration due to gravity g. It might seem that 
ascertaining g is simple: measure l and T, and solve for g. However, the equation is idealized, 
neglecting various features of real-world pendulums. To apply it, we must employ a range of 
corrections—accounting for the non-uniform mass distribution of the bob, the effects of the 
surrounding air and so on. If our measurement is to be accurate, this requires delicate 
modeling of the apparatus we are working with. “Simply put” Morrison says “without models 
there is no measurement.” (2009, 50).   
Although Morisson’s discussion is about measurement, her argument is readily adapted to 
hypothesis-driven experimentation (Massimi & Bhinji 2015 also emphasize how simulations 
are often intertwined with experimental practice).9 Hypotheses are often idealized, 
necessitating local modeling to facilitate contact with relevant empirical systems. Indeed, if 
one wants to test whether the ideal pendulum equation accurately describes any real 
pendulum, similar modeling is required. Morrison could just as well have stated, then, 
“without models there is no confirmation”. 
We agree that, often enough, there is no measurement, nor confirmation, without models. 
But the fact that models are often necessary for obtaining data does not blur the 
model/experiment distinction, nor does it imply that models can serve in a confirmatory 
capacity. To see why, it will help to use a distinction between data and phenomena (Bogen 
and Woodward, 1988). Data are the immediate records of a causal interaction between a 
scientist and her object of study. The readings of one’s instruments, the notes in one’s lab 
book, photographs of tracks in a bubble chamber, etc. Phenomena are the stable features of 
the object which give rise to data, and that our theories aim to explain or predict. 
Observations and experimental “runs” produce instances of phenomena, which we collect 
data from. These data then serve as evidence for phenomena: tracks in the bubble chamber 
                                                             
9 Massimi & Bhinji take arguments for the epistemic power of experimentation to turn on a 
distinctive causal interaction between scientists and the objects of their investigations which 
simulations lack. They argue that in experimental physics, intervening and representing are 
inextricable, and that no particular interaction between scientists and their experimental objects used 
in experimentation is unique, distinguishing it from simulations. In our terms, they deny that there is a 
special kind of experimental control. This argument, whatever its merits, is irrelevant for our position 
because we do not rely on a special kind of control. Rather, we rely on the notion of specimenhood, 




are evidence of the movement of a charged particle. Similarly, Newton recorded data 
pertaining to the position of the light on the far wall of his room. His phenomenon was the 
refraction of white light when passed through a prism at varying angles.  
Data are evidence for phenomena and moving from data to phenomena often requires a 
non-trivial inference. In the present context, it is perhaps best to speak of ‘experimental 
phenomena’, or ‘experimental effects’ – these are the stable behaviors of the object of study 
under experimental manipulation. It is these behaviors that the experimentalist aims to 
ascertain, and she does so by collecting data in the course of the experiment.  
 The records of l and T produced by the pendulum apparatus in Morrison’s example are 
data. The experimental phenomenon is the actual, true length of the bob and its period of 
oscillation. The data, i.e. what is recorded from the pendulum, is highly sensitive to 
interfering factors, as Morrison describes. Therefore, substantial modeling is necessary to 
arrive at an accurate estimate of the phenomenon – the value of g, for instance. However, this 
does not entail that the model is an experiment, nor that it is doing confirmatory work. For 
the model is still a means of representing the phenomenon, as well as, in this case, various 
interfering factors, which must be dealt with to infer the phenomenon from the data. 
Moreover, the results are relevant to confirming hypotheses about the pendulum in virtue of 
being obtained via engagement with a specimen. It is because of this relationship that the 
particular pendulum is informative about pendulums in general, even if model-based 
corrections are needed to make the move from data to phenomenon. Although models 
facilitate the inference from data to phenomena, the phenomenon’s being produced by a 
specimen is fundamentally responsible for the confirmatory (or dis-confirmatory) relationship 
between experimental results and hypotheses. 
Generally speaking, experimentation is a complex epistemic process, and the 
confirmatory business of generating experimental data, inferring phenomena, and testing 
hypotheses is frequently underwritten by sophisticated theory. Often this includes “… the use 
of computer-aided techniques and theoretical assumptions to control background noise, 
potential sources of errors, and model data to extract meaningful signals…” (72, Massimi & 
Bhinji 2015). Much in science is theory-mediated, and often theoretical representations are 
useful—perhaps even necessary—for such mediation to occur. However, recognizing the role 
of theory in data production does not undermine our contention that the basis of an 
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experimental result’s confirmatory power is grounded in a controlled manipulation of a 
specimen.  
Thus, while Morrison and others rightly highlight the importance of modeling in 
empirical work, it is best understood via the data/phenomena distinction, applied to the 
experimental object (see also Parker 2015). This is a subtle and interesting matter, but it does 
not undermine the distinctiveness of experiments.  
3.3 Borderline cases 
A third strategy for collapsing models and experiments proceeds by highlighting 
borderline cases. Several authors have commented on such cases – e.g. Wimsatt (2015), 
Parker (2008) and Franklin (1989) – but the most sustained discussion occurs in Parke 
(2014). Parke’s central examples are ‘bottle experiments’, especially those performed in 
Richard Lenski’s lab at Michigan State University. Lenski and his collaborators grew 
multiple lines of E. coli, over several decades, under various selection regimes, and 
investigated their long-term evolutionary dynamics. As Parke points out, often Lenski brings 
the same object, i.e. information about the same E. coli lineages, to bear on multiple targets. 
In some cases he targets features specific to E. coli, while in other cases the hypothesis 
concerns large-scale evolutionary patterns. The former pertain to relatively circumscribed 
phenomena in a particular species. The latter deal with abstract features of evolutionary 
processes, as many models do. Parke asks: are Lenski’s investigations an example of 
experimentation or modeling? Her answer: it depends on context. We do not necessarily 
dispute this, but it is important to explain how it relates to our account and why it does not 
conflict with it. 
There are two ways of understanding the kind of situation Parke describes. First, we could 
have a single experiment, relevant to hypotheses about different targets. This poses no 
challenge to our account, since a single object can serve as a specimen of more than one kind. 
On the (highly plausible) assumption that kinds are nested – one kind may be a sub-kind of 
another, like dogs and mammals or copper and metal – it is not surprising that an experiment 
can test multiple hypotheses by testing a claim about features that the sub-kind shares with its 
parent kind.  
Alternatively, we could take the case as an experiment with respect to E. coli, and a 
model with respect to macroevolution writ large (this is Parke’s reading). This interpretation 
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too is fine by our lights. A single object of study can play multiple roles, so long as these 
roles can be reasonably well distinguished and the relevant inferences can be kept reasonably 
distinct. When the inference is from lab E. coli to the truth or falsity of a hypothesis about 
natural E. coli or related bacteria, we have experimental confirmation. Lenski and company 
are conducting a controlled investigation of specimens, and the inference from object to 
target operates along the lines we have discussed. When the targets are macroevolutionary (or 
ecological) events, E. coli are a kind of model, i.e. they are taken as a representation of large-
scale trends over evolutionary time (see Levy & Currie 2015, section 6.3, also Currie 
forthcoming). Such a model is a material theoretical device, but that does not make it unusual 
(Weisberg, 2013). On this understanding, Lenski-type work consists of both experimentation 
and modeling, depending on its target.  
These multiple roles are a prevalent feature of scientific practice. When a simulationist is 
constructing, calibrating and testing their object – ‘verifying’, in simulation-talk – they are 
treating the simulation as a specimen. This is because they are interested in the object’s 
properties. In verification, the model is not treated as a representation (although the model’s 
intended representational role matters for determining which properties are examined). 
Further, an object of investigation can act, as we have seen, as both a material model and as 
an experiment because it is the underlying justification of inferences from object to target that 
matters. Manipulation of the same object can tell us about some part or aspect of nature 
because it was drawn from it, and hence it is a specimen with respect to that part or aspect. 
But it can also serve as a representational construct, informing about nature due to theoretical 
assumptions about its resemblance to the relevant part of the natural world. In the latter case 
it would function as a model. Thus, on our account, whether an object is a model or being 
used experimentally depends in part on epistemic context: in particular, the focal properties 
under investigation and the manner in which their resemblance to the target's properties is 
justified. As focal properties and the underlying justification of object-to-target inferences 
shift, so too do crucial epistemic features of the investigation.  
Our account, then, accommodates important borderline cases—and moreover, it captures 
just what makes them borderline. Surely, the inferences drawn by Lenski and his 
collaborators are firmer when the extrapolation is from experimental E. coli to wild E.coli, 
relative to when they move from evolutionary dynamics observed in a test-tube to dynamics 
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on the macro-scale. One is less paradigmatically experimental than the other and this is 
reflected in their confirmatory properties.  
Generally speaking, comparing experiments to models and other theoretical devices 
demonstrates the central importance of specimenhood for generating confirming evidence. 
Models are subject to something like control, indeed our capacity to repeatedly manipulate 
models often outstrips what we can do with experiments. This control makes models ideal 
tools for understanding how various parts of our knowledge interact: they can bring 
background knowledge together with observations to generate data and phenomena, they can 
test for coherence, and draw out the empirical consequences of our theories. And all of this 
can matter for how well supported we think a theory is. However, models are not specimens 
like the objects of experiments are. As such, they do not involve a confrontation between our 
theoretical ideas and the world. This underlies a central difference between the validation of 
models and experiments: whereas experimental validation depends upon the typicality of the 
specimen in question, considerations of typicality do not enter into model-target inferences. 
This difference in validation also highlights a difference in confirmatory power. 
4. Experiments versus natural occurrences 
Our discussion in the previous section pointed to a key difference between 
experimentation and modelling. The former engages with specimens, and may therefore test 
hypotheses vis-à-vis the kind of system they pertain to. In contrast, models are 
representations rather than specimens. To the extent that they play a part in confirmatory 
studies, there is a different underlying logic, and their role is less direct. We now turn to 
observations, a different sort of empirical work. Here, we argue for the mirror image of the 
previous contrast: observations resemble experiments with regards to specimenhood but lack 
crucial control-related features.  We will discuss both ‘ordinary’ field-work and so-called 
‘natural experiments’. In doing so, we fill in our account of control’s epistemic features, and 
complete our argument that experimentation’s distinctive status stems from the combination 
of control and specimenhood. 
4.1  Observational Fieldwork 
In observation one goes out to the field (or looks through a telescope, sends probes to the 
ocean floor etc.) and collects data about some portion of the world. In ‘ordinary’ observation 
this is relatively indiscriminate: the scientists record instances of the type of system in 
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question, determining whether they have the relevant properties pertinent to the hypothesis.  
To fix ideas, suppose that the hypothesis takes the form of a quantified conditional such as 
‘all (or some, or such-and-such a proportion of) Fs are G’. In observation, ‘ordinary’ or 
otherwise, one may well be gathering data from specimens. What distinguishes ‘ordinary’ 
observation from experiment is that the specimens are not under the observer’s control: she 
just happens upon them, as it were, recording the prevalence of Fs that are (and are not) G. 
Such information is relevant to confirming the hypothesis, on the assumption that one’s data 
pertains to specimens. However, such data is not as powerful, confirmationally speaking, as 
that generated in an analogous experiment – i.e. one where an object is subjected to a 
controlled manipulation, bringing about Fness, and determining whether it leads to Gness. In 
elaborating this point we draw on work by Samir Okasha (2011).  
Okasha relies on the ‘Hypothetico-Deductive’ principle, i.e. the idea that scientific 
hypotheses are confirmed when their predictions, in particular their direct ‘positive 
instances’, are borne out.10 Suppose we test a hypothesis of the form “all Fs are G”.11 As 
Okasha points out, the most relevant observations would take the form Fa → Ga (i.e. positive 
instances of the generalization). In particular, these observations would be preferable to those 
of the form Fa & Ga. After all, the former is a direct consequence of the hypothesis, and 
hence of direct confirmatory relevance; while the latter, conjunctive claim, needn’t be an 
instance of the generalization in question (it may, e.g., be an instance of ‘all Gs are F’). 
Hence it has less confirmatory relevance.  
When exerting control, an object of study a is isolated, Fa is bought about, and we check 
whether Ga (co-)occurs. In contrast, in performing a non-experimental (i.e. non-controlled) 
observation one cannot, as it were, assume that Fa and test whether Ga. Instead one merely 
observes an a that is an F as well as a G, obtaining the information that these facts coincide, 
which is of lesser confirmatory power with regards to the generalization at issue. So an 
experimental test supplies direct confirmation of ‘all Fs are Gs’ in a way that the mere 
coincidence of Fness and Gness does not. Generally, in an experiment, one obtains 
                                                             
10 Okasha relies on Bayesian ideas to argue for the Hypothetico-Deductive (HD) principle. In line 
with our general attitude of separating, as far as possible, the discussion of the means of confirmation 
from a discussion of the confirmatory relation, we here assume the HD principle, but we are not 
presupposing a Bayesian (nor any other specific) justification for it. 
11 The argument applies beyond universal generalizations, to any claim that has a conditional 
form, as noted above. We suspect that the argument can be extended (perhaps in a modified form) to 
other sorts of hypotheses, but since conditional claims are a central and common cases, we will not 
look beyond them explicitly.  
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information going beyond the fact that certain conjunctions obtain. Specifically, one obtains 
information about what happens when certain antecedent conditions have been fulfilled.  
Thus, controlling a specimen provides a qualitatively stronger confirmatory position vis-
à-vis ‘passive’ observation. So far so good; and, we think, relatively uncontroversial. But 
what about naturally occurring circumstances which appear to mimic experimental control – 
so-called natural experiments?  
4.2 Natural ‘experiments’ 
‘Natural experiments’ have been compared to traditional experiments. Woodward, for 
example, takes them to have the same basic form, differing only in the source of control: 
‘Natural experiments’ typically involve the occurrence of processes in nature that 
have the characteristics of an intervention [… However these] do not involve human 
action or at least are not bought about by deliberate human design (2003, 94). 
Although Woodward is not in the business of problematizing the experiment/observation 
distinction here, others have (Morgan 2013; Bromham 2016; O’Malley 2016). 12 The term 
‘natural experiment’ is heard most often in contexts where experimental access is limited: 
studies of the deep past, or of large-scale, complex systems. By our account of experiments, 
what it would take for a natural observation to count as ‘experimental’ is clear: isolation, 
repeatability and manipulation must be not only possible, but often realized. 
We do not deny that there are significant analogies between experiments simpliciter and 
natural experiments. For instance, Bromham (2016) reports a study investigating the 
apparently high rates of molecular evolution in parasitic plants. Noting the multiple origins of 
parasitism in flowering plants, she adds: 
This is like an experiment that has been run again and again using different kinds of 
plants… Parasitic plants are highly variable, but if you have enough of these 
independently derived parasitic lineages you can start to ask whether, despite the great 
                                                             
12 Sometimes, such claims are made within science, with respect to a particular area or set of 
questions. For example, Stephen J. Gould explicitly takes events in life’s history to play experiment-
like roles (e.g. in his 1989. See also Beatty, 2006). 
22 
 
differences between them, there are also any commonalities. Each of these parasitic 
lineages is like a single experimental treatment line...  (Bromham 2016, 48). 
Indeed, under such conditions ‘natural experiments’ may very well deliver confirmatory 
goods. However, 'natural experiments' rarely repeat and are, virtually by definition, not 
replicable.  Repetition underwrites both inferences from data to phenomena and establishing 
a result’s external validity vis-à-vis a target.13 Generating such knowledge often requires an 
enormous number of variations, test runs, and so forth.  Although natural experiments can 
play a confirmatory role, their power is limited by a lack of finely varied repetitions—in 
seeing this, we also expand on the confirmatory significance of control. 
Repetition is required for establishing reliability, and sifting data from noise. Moreover, 
repeated manipulation allows experimental scientists to explore and characterize an effect in 
some detail. Newton systematically varied the angle of the prism and observed the angle of 
the light on the far screen. Thus, he established not only that light passing through a prism 
will refract, but also how it will refract: there is a regular mathematical relationship between 
changes in the prism’s angle and the position of light on the far wall. Repetition, then, allows 
an experimentalist to reliably examine fine grained dependencies between variables – how 
one variable changes across a range of alterations to another variable. Such information is 
inaccessible from a small set of ‘natural’ experiments. 
Paradigm experiments produce multitudinous data of this sort. In this they are unlike the 
methods Bromham discusses. Newton’s account of the experimentum crucis does not 
describe a single event. It is, rather, a formula or recipe for an experimental setup and one 
that was carried out, by Newton and others, many times. Even in cases like Bromham’s, it is 
extremely unlikely that natural experiments could provide the same level of detail—and 
repeated detail—provisioned by successful experiments. 
Summing up, there are important similarities between some natural observations and 
experiments. In some circumstances naturally occurring events provide something like 
control: in principle, they may provide test cases of the sort Okasha highlights. However, 
experimentation’s special confirmatory power is due to its capacity to allow us to ‘make our 
                                                             
13 ‘Repetition’ involves running the same experiment over and again. This capacity in 
combination with isolation and manipulability allows the running of several, slightly different 
interventions. Both of these are lacking in natural experiments.  
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own luck’, via repeated experimental runs. It is, of course, possible for circumstances to 
conspire; nature may fortuitously work as an extremely busy scientist. Then we will obtain a 
rich set of cases, with enough repetition. In such situations we have something approaching a 
bone-fide experiment and this may supply substantial confirmation for a hypothesis. 
However, this is vanishingly rare; many observations that receive the label ‘natural 
experiment’ do not, in fact, have the epistemic power of experiments properly so-called. As 
such, specimenhood alone is not sufficient for the confirmatory prowess of experiments. 
Control allows the generation of bountiful fine-grained, relevant, data and evidence. Further, 
control provides flexibility in experiment design, allowing scientists to respond to the 
happenstances of empirical fortune. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Experiments have special confirmatory power in virtue of being controlled investigations 
of specimens. We have elaborated on these key notions – control and specimenhood – and 
have buttressed our account via a critical discussion of attempts to conflate experiments with 
models, on the one hand; and with certain kinds of observations, on the other hand. As we’ve 
seen, control endows experimentalists and modelers with the capacity to generate finely 
detailed, rich information about their object of study. Experimentalists and ‘passive’ 
observers often have specimens as objects of study, and this underwrites their evidential 
relevance, through the object and target’s sharing focal properties. But only in experiments 
are control and specimenhood bought together, combining to generate the confirmatory 
power of that method—the traditional view is thus vindicated. 
Our account shows why the experimenter is in a better situation vis-à-vis confirmation 
than other scientists. But it does not show, nor do we hold, that non-experimental scientists – 
modellers, observers, natural experimenters, and so forth – are somehow less ‘scientific’ than 
their experimental brethren. Confirmation is but one aspect of science among many. Further, 
our account explicitly targets an ideal: we’re interested in successful experiments. As we’ve 
discussed, in some contexts control and specimenhood might conflict, and indeed the range 
of theories which are amenable to experimental testing might be limited. That said, insofar as 
confirmation is concerned, experiments are uniquely powerful in virtue of being controlled 
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